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Abstract 
Charter schools can influence a school district’s costs by reducing economies of scale and by 
changing the share of high cost students a district serves, but might also increase the district’s 
efficiency through competition. Utilizing data for New York State school districts from 1998/99 
to 2013/14, we estimate difference-in-differences models to assess the effect of charter schools 
on enrollment and student composition. Then, we estimate an expenditure function, using data 
prior to the charter school program, to measure the costs associated with reaching a given 
performance standard for students in various need categories and different enrollments. Next, 
using the entire data set, we run a second expenditure function to determine changes in efficiency 
associated with charter school entry. We find that charter schools increase the cost of providing 
education, and that these cost increases are larger than short-run efficiency gains, but are offset 
by efficiency gains in the long term. 
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Highlights 
 Charter schools change the costs and efficiency of providing education in school districts.
 Cost increases are driven by increases in share of poor students in traditional public
schools.
 Charter school increase the efficiency of providing education. The effects are larger in the
long than in the short-run.
 The cost increases are larger in the short-run than the efficiency gains, but in the long run
efficiency gains offset cost increases.
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1. Introduction  
Since the beginning of the charter school movement, concerns have been raised that charter 
schools would drain resources from traditional public schools and increase per pupil costs by 
attracting students that are the least costly to educate (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999; Molnar, 
1996; Moody’s, 2013). On the other hand, advocates have argued that competition created by 
charter schools can be ―a tide that lifts all boats‖ by pushing public schools to increase efficiency 
(Hoxby, 2003b). Given the financial constraints many school districts faced after the Great 
Recession (Hull, 2010; Jackson, Wigger, & Xiong, 2018) and the growing number of charter 
schools (NCES, 2018), the question of how charter schools influence districts’ student 
composition, costs, and efficiency is more salient than ever.   
       A few studies have examined the impact of charter schools on district revenues and 
expenditures finding negative fiscal impacts, i.e. that the loss in revenues due to charter schools 
are greater than expenditure reductions made possible by transfer of students to charter schools 
(Arsen & Ni, 2012; Bifulco & Reback, 2014; Ladd & Singleton, 2018). Charter school programs 
typically transfer revenues close to average spending per pupil from traditional public schools to 
charter schools. However, a substantial proportion of a districts costs are fixed over some short-
term, and thus, the amount of spending the district can shed when a student transfers to a charter 
school is less than average spending per pupil. Note that this argument is one about short-run 
fiscal impacts. From a long-run perspective, a much lower proportion of a district’s costs are 
fixed and so the amount of spending a district can shed in response to a charter school enrollment 
should be much closer to average per pupil spending and the amount of revenue transferred to 
charter schools.   
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 Nonetheless, charter schools can have longer run fiscal impacts on traditional public 
school districts for at least two reasons. First, the transfer of students out of traditional school to 
charter schools can shift the cost function faced by a local school district. That is, charter school 
enrollments can increase the per pupil expenditures required by a district using standard 
technologies and practices to achieve targeted student outcomes. A significant literature shows 
that the per pupil expenditures required to achieve targeted student outcomes, i.e. district costs, 
are influenced by the number of student served and the additional needs students may have 
(Downes, 2004; Downes, & Stiefel, 2008; Downes & Pogue, 1994; Duncombe & Yinger, 1998, 
2005, 2008, 20011a, 2011b; Eom, Duncombe, Nguyen-Hoang, & Yinger, 2014; Imazeki, 2008; 
Imazeki & Reschovsky, 2003, 2004, 2006; Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001 2003). In particular, 
larger school districts might be able to achieve economies of scale and thus require lower per 
pupil expenditures to achieve a given level of outcomes. Thus, when a traditional public school 
district loses students to a charter school the district may suffer diseconomies that increase the 
per pupil costs of achieving educational outcomes. Also, students from low-income families, 
English language learners, and/or students with disabilities will tend to have additional needs, 
and thus require more resources to achieve educational outcomes. So if transfers to charter 
school change the proportion of students served by a district who are in these high need 
categories, then that can also shift the cost function faced by a school district. 
Several studies have tried to estimate the effect of charter schools on student composition 
in traditional schools. Regarding the enrollment of low-income students, the evidence is mixed, 
with several studies finding that charter school have higher concentrations of nearby poor 
students than traditional public schools (Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Cohodes, Dynarski, Fullerton, 
Kane, & Pathak, 2009; Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel, & Rothstein, 2005; Epple, Romano, & 
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Zimmer, 2016; Sass, 2006) and others finding lower concentrations of poor students in charter 
schools compared to nearby traditional public schools (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 
2008; Finnigan, Adelman, Anderson, Cotton, Donelly, & Price, 2004; Hoxby, Murarka, & Kang, 
2009; Tuttle, Teh, Nichols-Barrer, Gill, & Gleason, 2010). Most researchers agree that charter 
schools serve fewer special education students and English language learners than nearby 
traditional public schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009; Bifulco & Buerger, 2015; Finnigan et al., 
2004; Miron, Urschel, Mathis, & Tornquist, 2010; Sass 2006). As some charter schools 
specialize in educating these student groups, however, there is a large variation in what students 
are drawn to charter schools (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). None of these studies have tried 
to quantify the effect of enrollment changes that result from charter schools on district costs. 
The second way that charter schools can affect district expenditures, and thus their fiscal 
position, in the long-run is by influencing district efficiency. Thus, if competition for students 
and revenues spur school districts to use resources more efficiently to achieve student outcomes, 
then the per pupil expenditures a districts actual spends to achieve a given level of student 
outcomes will decrease. Several studies have tried to estimate the effect of charter schools on the 
performance of students who remain in traditional public schools (Booker et al., 2008; Bettinger, 
2005; Cordes, 2017; Imberman, 2011; Zimmer, Gill, Booker, Lavertu, & Sass, 2009). Only a few 
researchers have found positive effects and most studies have found no effect at all.
2
 However, 
because these studies do not simultaneously examine the effects of charter schools on district 
expenditures, they do not tell us the effect of charter schools on school district efficiency. 
Among the studies of which we are aware of, one has tried to estimate the efficiency of charter 
school relative to traditional public schools (Gronberg, Jansen, & Taylor, 2012), but none have 
tried estimate the effect of charter schools on the efficiency of traditional public schools.  
2 For a comprehensive overview of the literature see Gill (2016) and Epple et al. (2016). 
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This study draws on concepts from the literature on educational costs to estimate the 
effect that charter schools have on the amount of per pupil expenditures districts spend to 
achieve a given level of student outcomes, i.e. on district costs and efficiency. More specifically, 
we investigate the following three research questions: 1) what is the impact of charter schools on 
student composition and enrollment in traditional public schools; 2) what is the effect of changes 
in student composition and enrollment caused by charter schools on district costs; and 3) how 
does charter school competition affect school district efficiency. 
 Our empirical strategy builds on techniques applied in program evaluation (Card & 
Krueger, 1994; Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and education cost-function research (Downes, 2004; 
Downes, & Stiefel, 2008; Downes & Pogue, 1994; Duncombe & Yinger, 1998, 2005, 2008, 
20011a, 2011b; Eom, Duncombe, Nguyen-Hoang, & Yinger, 2014; Imazeki, 2008; Imazeki & 
Reschovsky, 2003, 2004, 2006; Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001 2003). Utilizing data from New 
York State, we start by using difference-in-differences models to estimate the effect of charter 
school entry on district enrollment and the percentages of students in various need categories. 
Next, we estimate an expenditure function using information for the 1998/99 school year, the 
only year in our data set without charter schools, controlling for service outcomes, factors related 
to district costs, and other factors that might influence district efficiency. The results of this 
expenditure function provide us with cost measures for students in various need categories and 
enrollment. Additionally, we estimate a second expenditure function utilizing all years in our 
data set, including only previously defined treatment and control districts, and adding districts 
and year fixed effects to measure the impact of charter schools on school district efficiency. In a 
final step, using estimates from the difference-in-differences models and the first expenditure 
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function, we calculate changes in district costs associated with charter school entry and compare 
them with the charter school efficiency effects from the second expenditure function. 
Our findings are consistent with research showing that charter schools increase the 
proportion of students in traditional public schools who come from low-income families and who 
have disabilities. We also find that the entry of charter schools is associated with a decrease in 
the proportion of students who have limited English proficiency in traditional public schools. 
However, only the changes in students receiving free lunch caused by charter schools are large 
enough to have a statistically significant impact on per pupil costs. Overall, charter schools 
increase the minimum per pupil amount a typical sized district needs to spend for a given level of 
performance by 7.5 percent in the short-run and by 7.1 percent in the long-term. 
Our results also suggest that efficiency gains in response to charter school entry decrease 
the per pupil amount districts spend to achieve a given level of outcomes by 3.6 in the short-term 
and 6.8 percent in the longer-run. This finding is consistent with literature showing that charter 
school entry leads to improved service provision in traditional public schools. Comparing cost 
increases and efficiency gains, charter schools increase traditional public schools’ expenditure 
per pupil used to reach a given performance level by 3.9 percent in the first four years and by 
0.25 percent five and more years after charter school entry. Thus, on average, charter schools 
increase costs in the short-term but increases in efficiency offset these cost increases in the long 
run.   
We further find that school districts with high levels of charter schools enrollments, 
relative to districts with small charter school enrollments, experience smaller increases in costs 
and larger efficiency gains leading to net reductions in the expenditures used to achieve a given 
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level of outcomes of 4.6 percent in the first four years after charter school entry and 11.6 percent 
in later years.   
Our findings contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we provide 
additional evidence that charter schools impact enrollment and student composition in traditional 
public schools. Second, our study establishes, theoretically and empirically, that charter school 
programs can influence the cost and efficiency of traditional public schools districts, and that 
both of these factors have to be considered in estimating the net effect of charter schools on 
spending in traditional public schools. Third, we develop an approach that combines methods 
from program evaluation and cost function literature to estimate the effects of charter schools on 
school district expenditures—clarifying both the strengths and limitations of the approach. 
Finally, we provide evidence that the entry of charter schools in New York has both increased 
both per pupil cost of education and efficiency in traditional public school districts.   
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the charter 
school program in New York State. Sections 3 and 4 lay out the key conceptual considerations 
that guide the interpretation of the analysis and outline the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes 
the samples and measures we use to implement our empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the 
results of our analysis and Section 7 investigates if districts with large charter school enrollments 
experience charter school effects that are different from the average district. The last section 
summarizes our conclusions. 
2. New York State Charter School Program
In New York State, the first charter schools began operating in the fall of 1999. Students 
are able to apply for admission and schools selects students by lottery if they are oversubscribed. 
Although students outside the district where a charter school is located can be admitted, the 
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lottery process gives preference to students residing in the district in which the charter school is 
located (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2854 (2b)). 
 A charter school’s primary source of funding in New York State is per pupil payments 
from the districts in which their students reside. The amount a district pays per student is equal to 
the approved operating expenses per pupil in the district. Also, charter schools receive additional 
funding for students with disabilities from the district. The additional weight students with 
disabilities receive in the funding formula varies between 1.65 for students with severe 
disabilities and 0.9 for students with less severe disabilities. Charter schools do not receive 
additional funding for students with limited English proficiency or those living in poverty. 
Further, the districts provide textbooks, software, transportation, health and special education 
evaluation services to charter schools (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2853).   
 Charter schools in New York are closely regulated by the charter school authorizers, 
which include the SUNY Board of Trustees and the State Board of Regents. Additionally, local 
school district boards are able to approve district schools converting to charter schools, with final 
approval given by the State Board of Regents. The National Alliance of Public Charter Schools 
identifies New York as being among the top states in the use of comprehensive monitoring and 
data collection as well as clear renewal, nonrenewal, and revocation processes to oversee charter 
schools (NAPCS, 2017).  
 For data availability reasons, we focus on charter schools outside New York City (NYC) 
in this study. Table 1 shows the 20 districts outside NYC that have or have had charter schools 
since 1999/00. The first charter school was opened in Albany in the fall of 1999. The highest 
counts of charter schools are in Albany, Buffalo, and Rochester. Albany, Buffalo, and 
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Lackawanna have the highest shares of charter school enrollments with more than 20 percent of 
resident public school students attending charter schools in these districts.  
For the purpose of defining which districts are exposed to charter school competition, it is 
worth noting that all of the districts that have substantial charter school enrollments (more than 3 
percent) also have high shares of low-income students (more than 39 percent being eligible for 
free lunch). In contrast, even when charter schools locate in districts with low levels of poverty, 
only small numbers of students from these districts choose to attend charter schools. For a 
handful of charter schools, including those located in Greece, Ithaca, Kenmore-Tonawanda, and 
Roosevelt, the majority of their enrollments are drawn from outside the district where they are 
located. With the exception of Roosevelt, the districts where these charter schools are located 
have low levels of charter school enrollment themselves and low levels of poverty, while the 
adjacent districts that send the majority of students to the charter school have high shares of 
charter school enrollment and high percentages of students receiving free lunch. So it appears 
that districts with relatively high percentages of low-income students (above 39%) and that have 
charter schools located within their boundaries or in an adjacent school district are subject to 
charter school competition. 
Table 2 breaks down charter school enrollment for different grade levels and years. In all 
but six districts, charter schools start with enrolling students in grades K to 8 and nine districts 
add additional grade levels in later time periods while two districts serve only high school 
students. Thus, charter schools tend to use entry strategies that start with small enrollments in 
early grades and then increase student numbers and grade levels over time.  
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3. Conceptual Considerations
Analysis can focus on the impacts of charter schools on the public school system as a 
whole, including charter and traditional public schools, or on the traditional public schools 
themselves. Estimates of impacts on the entire system of public schools and thus, all public 
school students, would provide a more comprehensive picture. However, much of the discussion 
of charter schools has focused on the impacts on traditional public schools, including the 
questions of whether or not charter schools drain resources, cream-skim low cost students, or 
push traditional public schools to operate more efficiently. For this study, reliable fiscal data on 
charter schools is not available in a form that is comparable to that available for traditional public 
school districts, and so we focus on the effects of charter schools on traditional public schools. 
We use a cost function approach to characterize the relationship between spending, 
student performance, and other school district characteristics. Costs are defined as the minimum 
spending required to reach a given level of student performance using current best practices. 
Because not all districts operate efficiently and we cannot directly observe which districts are 
and are not efficient, costs cannot be observed directly and cost functions have to be estimated 
using district spending as the dependent variable and indirect controls for efficiency. Spending is 
greater than costs when school districts are inefficient and deviate from current best practices 
(Downes & Pogue, 1994; Duncombe & Yinger, 1998, 2005, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; Reschovsky & 
Imazeki, 2001, 2003). 
More formally, education costs, C, are determined by student performance, S, resource 
prices W, student composition P, and enrollment, N. If we let e stand for school district 
efficiency with a value of 1 in an efficient school district and a value between zero and one for 
an inefficient district, then the expenditure function can be written as: 
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Charter schools can influence a district’s costs in at least two ways. First, if there are 
economies of scale in education, then sufficiently large reductions in district enrollments due to 
students transferring to charter schools will increase the amount of per pupil expenditure 
required to achieve a given level of service outcomes. Second, charter schools can change the 
composition of students remaining in district schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009; Finnigan et 
al., 2004; Epple et. all, 2016). For instance, some studies have found that students from low-
income families, with limited English proficiency (LEP), and/or disabilities are less likely to 
transfer to charter schools than other students (Jabbar, 2016; West, Ingram, & Hind, 2006). If so, 
then charter school entry will increase the proportion of students in district schools with high 
levels of educational need, and thus, will increase the costs of achieving a given level of student 
outcomes.  
Charter schools may also influence the efficiency with which a school district operates. 
Advocates of expanding public school choice have argued that forcing public schools to compete 
for students will provide incentives for districts to improve services (Hoxby 2000, 2003a, 
2003b). If districts respond to charter school competition by adopting new educational programs 
or by reallocating resources from less to more productive uses, this could increase district 
efficiency. There are also reasons to believe that charter school competition might reduce the 
efficiency with which districts operate. First, Rockoff (2010) and Duncombe and Yinger (2011a, 
2011b) argue that it takes time for districts to adjust to rapid, unforeseen changes in enrollment, 
and thus, in the short-run, charter schools might reduce district efficiency. For instance, 
unforeseen reductions in enrollment might result in underutilization of administrators, facilities, 
or teachers in certain subjects (Bifulco & Reback, 2014). Second, the district might respond to 
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the entry of charter schools by adopting new programming that requires additional expenditures. 
If these new programs fail to increase student outcomes, then the result will be decreased 
efficiency.  
4. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy starts with determining treatment and control districts. Then, we 
utilize difference-in-differences models to estimate the effect of charter school entry on district 
enrollment and the percentages of students in various need categories. Next, we estimate an 
expenditure function using information for the 1998/99 school year, the only year in our data set 
without charter schools. The results of this expenditure function provide us with cost estimates 
for students in various need categories and enrollment. Additionally, we estimate a second 
expenditure function using all years in our data set and the treatment and control districts 
established in the first step of the empirical strategy. We include in this equation a charter school 
identifier to measure how charter schools influence school district efficiency. Finally, using 
estimates from the first expenditure function and the difference-in-differences models, we 
calculate changes in district costs and compare them with the charter school efficiency effects 
from the second expenditure function. 
Table 1 shows that all districts with a high share of charter school enrollment are located 
in or adjacent to a district that has a charter school. There are no districts with low-shares of free 
lunch eligible students in 1999/00 that ever reach significant levels of charter school enrollment 
during the time period we observe, even when charter schools are located within the district 
borders or close by. Because having charter schools located nearby and having a high share of 
students in poverty are the primary predictors of charter school enrollment, we define our 
treatment group as all school districts that have charter schools or that are adjacent to a district 
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with a charter school and that have at least 39 percent of students receiving free lunch during the 
1999/00 school year.
3
 As a control group, we use all school districts with at least 39 percent 
share of students receiving free lunch in 1999/00 that neither have a charter within its border nor 
are adjacent to a district with charter school. Further, we limit the group of control districts to 
those that have an enrollment greater than 2,000 students because the treated districts are all at 
least that large.  The final sample includes 14 control and 14 treated districts, each of which we 
observe for the year 1998-99 through 2013-14 (16 years).  Of the 14 treated districts, 13 are 
observed for at least 8 post-treatment years.
4
  
We begin the analysis by using this sample of treatment and control districts to estimate 
the effects of charter schools on the key factors related to costs that are likely to be influenced by 
charter school entry, namely enrollment and student composition. Specifically, we estimate: 
(1) 
where     is either log of enrollment, percentage of free-lunch eligible, percentage of limited 
English proficient, or percentage of students with disabilities for district   in year  ;         is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one for treatment group districts in the years after a 
charter school was first established in the district or an adjacent district, and 0 otherwise;    is a 
district specific fixed effect, and    represents year fixed effects. The district fixed effects control 
for district characteristics that do not change over time and the year fixed effects for annual 
shocks experienced by all districts in our sample.
5
 Estimates of    indicate how much more the 
variable of interest increased or decreased in the treatment districts during the years following 
3 In two districts, Utica and Greece, charter schools open in 2013/14. Because we do not observe a time period after 
the charter schools openings, we consider these areas control districts. 
4
 The treatment districts include all of the districts listed in Table 1 that have 39 percent or more students receiving 
free lunch in 1999, plus Cohoes, Niagara Falls, and Rensselaer. As noted earlier, Utica and Greece are excluded 
from the treatment group and considered controls as we do not observe any impacts post-period. 
5 We also run models using district specific time trends. Compared to models without trends, the coefficients on the 
charter school variable are of similar magnitude but less precisely estimated. 
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the entry of charter schools compared to control districts during the same years. The equations 
are estimated using OLS with robust standards errors clustered by district. 
To estimate the effect of changes in enrollment and student composition on costs, we 
draw on the cost function literature (Downes & Pogue 1994; Duncombe & Yinger 1998, 2005, 
2008, 2011a, 2011b; Eom, Duncombe, Nguyen-Hoang, & Yinger, 2014; Reschovsky & Imazeki 
2001, 2003). Particularly, we estimate the following expenditure function: 
(2) 
where all variables are defined as before, and  is a vector of variables that influences efficiency 
(discussed below) and     is an idiosyncratic error term.
6
 Similar to prior studies, we include a 
quadratic term for enrollment to model potential economies of scale (Andrews, Duncombe, & 
Yinger, 2002).  
Unlike the other analyses in this paper, which use district fixed effects to control for 
district factors that remain constant overtime and only districts in the treatment and control 
groups defined above, we estimate Equation (2) using cross sectional information for the 
1989/99 school year and a sample that includes all districts in New York State outside of New 
York City that have an enrollment of at least 2000 students. It is difficult to estimate the effect of 
many cost factors on expenditures in panel data models that include district fixed effects because 
too much of the variation in these factors is differenced away by fixed effects estimators 
(Duncombe, Nguyen-Hoang, & Yinger, 2015; Duncombe & Yinger, 2011b). In addition, 
estimating equation (2) with only 28 school districts results in imprecise parameter estimates. 
We choose to estimate the model using data from 1998-99 because it is the only school year in 
6 We state vectors and their coefficients in bold letters. 
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our data without charter schools, and hence cost estimates cannot be influenced by charter 
enrollment.  
School district spending and performance are simultaneously determined by district 
decision makers. Therefore, similar to Eom et al. (2014), we instrument for performance in our 
estimate of Equation (2) with exogenous traits of school districts in the rest of the district’s 
county. A district’s own choices are likely to be influenced by choices of nearby districts, and the 
choices of nearby districts are influenced by their exogenous traits. More specifically, we use 
average percentage of LEP students in the rest of the county as instruments.   
The estimates of    and    together with    in Equation 2 are interpreted as changes in 
district costs associated with alterations in student composition and student enrollment, 
respectively. These estimates can be combined with the estimated effects of charter school entry 
on student composition and enrollment (from Equation 1) to calculate the change in district costs 
associated with charter school entry. Specifically, the changes in district costs are computed as:  
 ̅
(3) 
    ̅   (4)
where            is the percentage change in per pupil costs associated with a change in the 
percentage of students in a specific need category   ;  ̅  denotes the average percentage of
students in need category,   ,among the treated districts          is the percentage change in 
costs associated with a change in the enrollments; and  ̅ is average enrollment for treated
districts prior to charter school enrollment. The coefficients      and     are the coefficients 
attached to the treatment variable in Equation 1 using percentages of students in various 
categories and the log of enrollment as dependent variables, respectively. For the estimated 
percentage change in district costs associated with charter induced changes in each cost variable, 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
15 
we estimate confidence intervals using linear combinations of the regression coefficients and 
their standard errors in Equation 3 and 4, which are based on the delta method.
7
 The total change 
in district costs is computed by adding up the change in costs associated with charter-induced 
changes in the percentages of low-income, disabled, and LEP students as well as enrollment.  
We estimate a second expenditure function, using all years in our data set and the sample 
limited to the treatment and control districts described earlier: 
(5) 
where all variables are defined as before, and    and    are district and year fixed effects, 
respectively, and     is an idiosyncratic error term.  As in our estimate of Equation 2, we 
instrument for performance with the average percent of LEP students in the county (excluding 
the focal district).    
The coefficient on the treatment variable in Equation 5,    , is our parameter of interest, 
and it captures the shift in the amount of expenditures used to achieve a given level of service 
outcome.  Since this model controls for other factors that influence district costs, we interpret 
this coefficient as the effect of charter schools on district efficiency. This interpretation depends 
on the assumption that we have controlled for all factors that influence district expenditures and 
that are correlated with the entry of charter schools. Three aspects of our analysis make this 
assumption plausible. First, the inclusion of district fixed effects controls for any unobserved 
factors that have constant effects on the costs or efficiency of a district overtime. Second, year 
fixed effects control for the effects of any temporal shocks that affect treatment and control 
group schools similarly.  Third, we include controls for a range of time varying variables that 
7 The confidence intervals for linear combinations are based on the delta method (Oehlert, 1992; Rice, 1994) and 
implemented using STATA’s suest and lncom commands. 
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might influence district efficiency. In this analysis, we do not worry that the variation in cost 
factors is limited by the inclusion of fixed effects, because we do not need to give a substantive 
interpretation to coefficients other than   in equation 5. 
In the last step of our analysis, we add the change in expenditures per pupil computed 
using the results from Equation 3 and 4 and changes in efficiency from Equation 5 to calculate 
the net effect of charter schools on school districts spending. Again, we compute confidence 
intervals using the delta method.   
There are several reasons to expect that the effects of charter schools on traditional public 
schools costs and efficiency will depend on the length of time since charter school entry. First, in 
response to enrollment losses, schools can shed some types of fixed costs in the longer run that 
they might be unable to shed in the shorter run. Thus, while the initial shock of enrollment losses 
might lead to decreases in efficiency in the short run as fixed inputs are under-utilitized, in the 
longer run this potential source of inefficiency can be mitigated by cutting costs that are fixed 
only in the short run. Second, it might take schools some time to adopt changes in operations in 
response to charter school competition and those changes might take some time to realize 
efficiency gains. Third, Table 2 shows that charter schools, in their first year of operation, enroll 
small numbers of students in early grades and over time increase the number of students and 
grade levels. Both larger enrollment losses and the fact that more schools and grade levels are 
facing competition might prompt more significant responses from schools and districts, and thus, 
larger efficiency gains. To estimate changes in the effects of charter school on costs and 
competition over time, we estimate Equations (1) and (5) breaking the post period down into 1-4 
years and 5-8 years after charter school entry.
8
     
8 We do not report results for being exposed more than eight years because we cannot discern between impacts 
based on the length of the treatment period and the composition of the treated districts. An indicator for being 
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Two caveats on our analysis are worth noting. First, in the framework we are using, 
inefficiency arises when a district uses resources less effectively than current technology allows, 
or when it spends money on outcomes other than the ones measured and included in our 
estimation of the expenditure equation. If charter schools cause districts to decrease (or increase) 
spending to achieve objectives other than the measures of student test scores that we include in 
our analysis, then that will be reflected as an increase (or decrease) in efficiency in our analysis. 
Second, if charter schools attract relatively high achieving students away from district schools 
(controlling for free-lunch eligibility, LEP status, and disability), such that districts are unable to 
achieve a given level of outcomes without increasing per pupil expenditures, then that will be 
interpreted as a decrease in district efficiency. Similarly, if charter schools attract relatively low 
achieving students, districts should be able to achieve a given level of outcomes with lower per 
pupil expenditure, which we would interpret here as an increase in efficiency. In other words, we 
cannot determine whether the change in efficiency associated with charter school entry, as we 
measure it, is the result of improved district programming and operations or changes in the 
underlying ability of its students.
9
  
5. Data and Measures
To estimate the effect of charter schools on school district expenditures, we use a data set 
including New York State school districts for the years 1998/99 to 2013/14 assembled from a 
variety of sources. Similar to prior studies, New York City is excluded because we do not have 
data necessary to include it in estimates of the cost function (Eom et al 2014; Duncombe & 
exposed for more than 8 year, however, is included in the estimation but not reported or discussed. Another strategy 
would be to drop observations for districts having charter schools for more than 8 years. In these specifications, we 
lose about ten percent of our observations and while the magnitude of the results is similar to the baseline results we 
present, coefficients are less precisely estimated particularly for the expenditure functions.  
9 It is worth noting that this limitation in interpretation would apply even if charter school entry were randomly 
assigned to districts. 
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Yinger 2005). This section explains the variables used in the analysis in more detail. All 
variables are measured for traditional public schools in a school district.  
Spending Measures 
To measure spending, we used the school district operating expenditure measure from the 
Fiscal Profile Reporting System (FPRS) maintained by the New York State Education 
Department (NYSED). As in other cost function research (Eom et al. 2014), we use an 
expenditure measure that includes spending for instruction, support services (including 
transportation
10
), and debt services (principal and interest). We excluded all tuition payments to 
charter schools from the measure. 
Performance Measures  
We use performance measures drawn from the New York State school district report 
cards. These measures are based on standardized tests examining student proficiency in 
mathematics and English Language Arts. Starting in 1998/99, this system was used consistently 
until the 2009/10 school year when NYSED made a change in the state testing program and the 
cut scores required for proficiency. We use a similar approach to Eom et al. (2014) to overcome 
this inconsistency. Specifically, we calculate adjusted proficiency rates based on cut scores 
before the change in proficiency levels assuming that the distribution of student test scores 
follows a normal distribution.
11
 
10 Cost function studies often exclude transportation as this type of spending is affected by factors such as sparsity of 
population as well as weather and road conditions, which are not likely to affect instructional spending (Duncombe 
and Yinger 2011a). In NYS school districts have to provide transportation for charter schools, and hence we leave 
transportation in the spending measure to fully capture the effect of charter schools on traditional school 
expenditures.   
11 Eom, et al. (2014) describe the approach in footnote 24 ―To correct the proficiency rates for a change in the cut 
score, we assume the distribution of student scores in each district follows a normal distribution. We then 
approximate the cumulative standard normal with: F{Z} = 1/[1 + exp{–1.702 Z}], where Z = (X – μ)/σ, X is the test 
score, and μ and σ are its mean and standard deviation, respectively. The proficiency rate at any given Z is (1 – 
F{Z}). Because our data set includes μ for each test in each district, we can use this equation to solve for σ using the 
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 We construct a performance index consisting of the equally weighted average percentage 
of students reaching proficiency levels in mathematics and English Language Arts in 4th and 8
th
 
grade. Further, we include the percentage of students receiving a Regents Diploma by passing at 
least five Regents exams and the percentage of students not dropping out of high school. This 
procedure allows us to include performance information for high school grades while still only 
needing one instrument for performance (instrument procedures are discussed later). Also, this 
approach is similar to Eom et al. (2014) and allows us to compare our cost function results with 
their findings.  
Cost-Related Measures 
Researchers have long recognized that the cost of education depends on many factors 
outside a school district’s control. These factors include the wage environment, student 
enrollment, and concentration of disadvantaged students among the student population (see 
Duncombe & Yinger, 2008 for an overview). To control for teacher salaries, we include the 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI) developed by Taylor and Fowler for the National Center for 
Education Statistics. The CWI is a measure of the systematic, regional variations in the salaries 
of college graduates who are not educators (Taylor & Fowler, 2005).
12
 District enrollment counts 
are also drawn from NYSED Report Cards and represent official counts of students registered in 
the district as of October 1 of each school year. As in other work on cost functions, we use the 
log of student enrollment and the log of enrollment squared to allow for a nonlinear relationship 
between per pupil expenditures and enrollment (Duncombe & Yinger, 2008, 2011a, 2011b). We 
also include the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, students with limited 
observed new cut score, XNEW, and the associated proficiency rate. With this estimate of σ we can then calculate 
ZOLD = (XOLD – μ)/σ, where XOLD is the old cut score. The proficiency rate at the old cut score is (1 – F{ ZOLD}).‖ 
12 Comparable wage index values estimated by Lori Taylor using the methods developed for NCES for each district 
and each year in our sample are available at http://bush.tamu.edu/research/faculty/Taylor_CWI/. 
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English proficiency, and students with disability, all of which are drawn from the NYSED school 
district report cards.   
Efficiency-Related Measures  
Costs are defined as the minimum spending required to provide students an opportunity 
to reach a given level of student performance. However, the dependent variable in the cost model 
is actual per pupil spending and if a district operates inefficiently, actual per pupil spending will 
exceed the minimum required spending. While it is not possible to measure efficiency directly, it 
is possible to control for it indirectly and thereby to minimize any omitted variable bias.  
Based on Duncombe and Yinger (2005, 2011a, 2011b), we control for efficiency by 
including variables in the expenditure function that have been linked to school district efficiency 
in previous research, but are themselves unlikely to be influenced by charter school entry. These 
efficiency-related variables include resident income, share of state aid, local tax share, 
percentage share of residents with college degrees, and the share of youth in the district.
13
  
Taxpayers in districts with high resident income and high shares of state aid are less 
likely to pressure public officials to operate efficiently compared to districts with lower fiscal 
capacity. They could also be more apt to spend money on non-tested subjects. As our 
performance measurement only captures improvement in test scores, the additional spending for 
non-tested subjects could decrease school district efficiency. The local tax share is defined as the 
ratio between the median housing value and the average per pupil housing value in the district. 
The smaller the ratio, the less the median voter in the district has to pay for an additional unit of 
education. Therefore, smaller ratios potentially increase the demand for education, but are also 
13 Eom et al. (2014) use New York States School Tax Relief Program (STAR) as efficiency variable. As models 
with and without the STAR variable show the same results, we decided to exclude the STAR measure from our 
expenditure function.   
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likely to decrease the incentive to monitor public officials. Demographic factors, such as the 
share of college educated parents and the share of children in the total population, have been 
found to decrease school district efficiency, and hence, we include these demographic factors in 
the cost models as well. The specific efficiency-related variables included in our analysis and the 
data sources used to construct those variables are detailed in Table 3.  
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the baseline year 1998/99, the only year in the 
data set without any charter schools. All variables are presented separately for treated and control 
districts. Differences in means are tested using a t-test. We see that the treatment and control 
districts are similar on the means of all variables, except that the treatment districts have 
significantly larger enrollments on average.  
6. Results
Impacts on Student Composition and Enrollment 
Table 4 provides the results for the difference-in-differences models measuring the 
impact of charter schools on cost-related factors. The table includes separate columns for each of 
the four dependent variables: percentage of the students eligible for free-lunch, percentage of 
students with limited English proficiency, percentage of students with disabilities, and the log of 
student enrollment in the district. The first column for each of the four dependent variables uses 
a single treatment variable which takes the value of one in all treatment districts in all years after 
the entry of the first nearby charter school. The second column splits up the post period and 
reports results for one to four and five to eight years after charter entry, allowing us to measure 
changes in the charter effect over time. 
Estimates using a single post period for the entire time after charter school opening 
suggest that charter school entry on average is associated with an increase in the share of 
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students receiving free lunch and the share of students with disabilities (i.e. who have an 
Individualized Education Plan - IEP), and a decrease in the share of students with limited English 
proficiency. The estimated effects indicate that after charter school entry, a district’s share of 
students receiving free lunch increases by almost 3 percent, the percent of students with 
disabilities increases by 1.61 percent, and the share of students with limited English proficiency 
decrease by 2.8 percent. The estimated effect of charter schools on the percent of students with 
limited English proficient is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5 percent level, while 
the estimated effects on the share of students with disabilities and receiving free lunch is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Looking at the results of the second specification, 
there is no evidence that any of these effects differ with the length of time that districts have been 
exposed to charter school competition.     
The estimates in column (7) indicate that charter school entry is associated with a 
decrease in enrollment of 7.4 percent, and that those effects are somewhat larger five to eight 
years after entry, then one to four years after entry. That effects on enrollment grow over time is 
consistent with the expansion in charter school enrollments following initial entry that is evident 
in Table 2. 
Estimated Effects on Costs 
Table 5 presents the results for Equation 2 using information on school districts with 
more than 2000 students and for the school year 1998/99. In the first stage of the spending 
analysis, which is used to address the endogeneity of student performance measures in the 
expenditure function, we use the average percentage of LEP students in the rest of a district’s 
county as an instrument for performance. In line with other expenditure function literature 
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(Duncombe & Yinger, 2011a, 2011b), the coefficient on the instrument is positive and 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  
The second stage results show the expected signs on key variables in the model— the 
performance index, the comparable wage index, and the factors related to efficiency. Moreover, 
they are similar in magnitude to the estimates obtained in other expenditure function research not 
using district fixed effects, and more particularly to the results by Duncombe and Yinger (2011a, 
2011b) for California and Missouri.  
The enrollment coefficients, -0.126 and 0.005, are not statistically significant but show 
the u-shaped relationship between cost per pupil and student enrollment that has been found in 
many previous studies (Andrews, Duncombe, & Yinger, 2002). Two factors explain why the 
estimated effects of enrollment are not significant, as they have been in other studies. First, our 
sample excludes districts with fewer than 2,000 students.  Earlier studies have indicated that 
economies of scale are exhausted at relatively low levels of enrollment and that the relationship 
between enrollment and costs is relatively flat for enrollments above 2000 (Andrews, Duncombe, 
& Yinger, 2002).  Second, our sample size is considerably smaller than recent studies 
(Duncombe and Yinger 2011a, 2011b).    
Calculating the effect of enrollment changes on the costs of providing education in New 
York State, we find that a one percent increase in enrollment decreases costs by 0.05 percent for 
districts with an enrollment of 2000 students and by 0.02 percent for districts with an enrollment 
of 30,000.
14
 The effect of enrollment on spending in districts with an enrollment equal to the 
average of our treated districts, 13,318 students, is -0.03 percent.  
As anticipated, the coefficients on the variable measuring the percentage of 
disadvantaged students are positive. The estimates attached to the variables measuring the 
14 Enrollment in treated districts ranges between 2,000 and about 30,000 students in 1999. 
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percent of students with disabilities and receiving free lunch are statistically significant at the 0.1 
and 0.01 level, respectively. A one percent growth in students with disabilities raises spending 
per pupil by 0.5 percent and a one percent increase in students receiving free lunch expands per 
pupil expenditure by 0.4 percent. The results are again comparable with the cost function results 
for California and Missouri (Duncombe & Yinger, 2011a, 2011b), which are 0.2 for disability 
and 0.5 for free lunch. 
The coefficient measuring the impact of LEP students on spending per pupil is smaller 
and less precisely estimated relative to the other variables capturing student needs. The size of 
the coefficients and the large confidence interval is likely explained by the small percentage of 
LEP students and the small variation in this measure in our sample of districts.   
To assess the magnitude of charter school effects on the costs of providing education in 
traditional public schools, we plug the appropriate coefficients from Table 4 and 5 into Equations 
3 and 4. We display the results for these calculations in Table 6. The cost effects based on 
changes in the number of students with disabilities, LEP, and receiving free lunch, evaluated at 
the mean per pupil spending among treated districts ($22,469), are $1,189 per pupil (5.29%), -
$42 (-0.19) per pupil, and $526 (2.34%) per pupil, respectively.
15
 Only the impact of charter 
schools on change in the share of students receiving free lunch has a statistically significant 
impact on costs. The effect of charter schools on treated districts with an average enrollment is 
$52 (0.23%). Combining all cost effects, charter schools increase spending in traditional schools 
by $1,724 per pupil (7.68%) on average. The large standard error on the estimated cost effect is 
mainly driven by the imprecisely measured impact of LEP students. Thus, we recalculate the 
                                                             
15 We calculate dollar values by multiplying the percentage change in cost with average per pupil spending in treated 
districts for 2014 ($22,469).   
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overall cost impact without the LEP estimate, which results in a statistically significant impact of 
charter schools on per pupil expenditure of $1,767 (7.86%) holding performance constant.   
We find similar impacts on costs breaking down the post period. Considering all cost 
effects together, the effect of charter schools on spending per pupil is $1,686 (7.5%) for one to 
four years and $1,584 (7.05%) for five to eight after charter school entry. Again, we recalculate 
the overall cost effect without the imprecisely estimated LEP coefficient on spending and state 
the results in the last row of cost effects in Table 7. The impacts are now statistically significant 
and amount to $1,725 (7.68%) and $1,627 (7.24%).  
Impacts on Efficiency 
Table 7 presents the results for Equation 5 using all years in our data set and the 
treatment and control districts described above. We show the charter treatment effects as dollar 
values in Table 6. Again we instrument for performance with the average percentage of LEP 
students in the rest of the county. The coefficients on the instrument is positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level in the first stage of the spending analysis.   
The treatment effect for the model using a single post period is statistically significant 
and suggests a reduction in per pupil expenditures associated with charter school entry of 3.3 
percent, which at the mean level of per pupil spending for the treated districts is a $741 per pupil 
reduction in spending per year. The second model breaks down the post period and shows an 
impact of 3.6 percent for one to four years and 6.8 percent for five to eight years after charter 
school entry, which at the treatment group mean level of spending amounts to cost reductions of 
$809 per pupil and $1,528 per pupil, respectively. The findings indicate that charter schools 
increase school district efficiency and that the effect grows over time. There are several reasons 
potentially explaining the growth in the charter school impacts over time. One reason is that 
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fixed costs could be reduced in the long run. Additionally, it may take some time to adopt 
changes in operations in response to charter competition and those changes could take some time 
to realize efficiency gains. Moreover, as the share of charter school enrollment grows over time 
efficiency effects are likely to increase as well.  
Net Impacts 
We add the cost and efficiency effects to create the net impact of charter schools on 
school district spending per pupil. The results of these calculations are shown in the last two 
rows of Table 6. For the specification using a single post period, we find that charter schools 
increase per pupil operating expenditures in traditional school districts by $983 (4.38%) holding 
student performance levels constant. Observing the net effect over time, charter schools increase 
spending necessary to reach a given level of performance by $877 (3.9%) in the first four years 
after charter school entry and by $56 (0.25%) in the later years. Recalculating net effects without 
the imprecisely measured impact of charter schools on the share of LEP students results in small 
increases in the estimates and large decreases in the standard errors. None of the net effects are 
statistically significant, however.   
The difference in effect size between earlier and later years is mainly driven by much 
larger efficiency gains in later time periods when charter schools enroll more students, operate a 
greater number of grade levels, and when traditional public schools have had more time to 
respond to charter school competition. Thus, although cost increases are greater than efficiency 
gains the first years immediately following charter school entry, over the long run, both effects 
offset each other.  
7. Extension of the Analysis  
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The initial results show that cost effects are smaller and efficiency gains are greater in later 
than earlier time periods, when charter schools serve more students and have greater enrollments 
(see Table 2). Based on these observations, a general argument could be made that districts that 
are more exposed to charter school competition are also more likely to change educational 
programs, making them more efficient, and close traditional schools, allowing them to decrease 
costs to reach a predetermined level of performance. Thus, we extend our analysis and reduce the 
treatment group to districts with charter school enrollments of more than 10 percent in 2014.  
The results for the difference-in-differences models are presented in Table 8 and show 
smaller charter school effects on the share of LEP and IEP students compared to the main 
specification. The impacts on enrollment are, not surprisingly, much larger and so is the effect of 
charter schools on the share of students receiving free lunch for later time periods. Both of these 
effects are also statistically significant.  
Combining the results from Table 8 with the cost estimates from Table 5, we calculate 
the effect of charter schools on district spending for districts with larger shares of charter school 
enrollment in Table 9. The largest difference between districts with large and small charter 
school enrollments is the smaller increase in share of IEP students in districts with larger charter 
enrollments. Perhaps the charter school sector in areas with sufficiently large charter school 
enrollments is able to achieve sufficient economies of scale to effectively serve students with 
disabilities and thus attract a large share of these students. However, in the longer-term, districts 
with large shares of charter school students also see larger increases in percent eligible for free-
lunch than do districts with smaller charter school enrollment, which increases the effects of 
charter school entry on costs. On net, the long run effects of charter schools on costs is slightly 
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smaller in districts with larger charter school enrollments than in those will smaller charter 
school enrollments.   
The results in Table 10 provide evidence of greater efficiency gains for districts with 
larger charter enrollments compared to the initial findings, suggesting that the efficiency results 
presented in Table 6 are driven by districts with high charter school penetration. Particularly, 
impacts are greater for later time periods with an effect of -11.6 percent, implying a reduction in 
expenditures necessary to achieve a given level of performance of $2,746 per pupil, evaluated at 
the mean of the spending per pupil in this restricted set of treatment districts. Several 
considerations might help to explain the large efficiency gains in these districts over the long-
term. When enrollment losses are sufficiently large, districts can take measures to reduce fixed 
costs. For instance, the city of Buffalo, one of the districts with high charter school penetration, 
closed several schools during the period of our study. Although some of these closures might 
have been in response to long standing downward trends in enrollments that preceded charter 
schools, additional enrollment losses resulting from charter school entry might have expedited 
school closure decisions.  Also, it might be that districts with larger enrollment losses to charter 
school might have more incentive to make operational changes to either help retain students, cut 
costs, or both. 
 Considering only districts with large levels of charter school enrollment, the net of cost 
and efficiency impacts is always negative amounting to -$185 (0.78%) for specifications using a 
single post period, of -$465 (1.96%) for earlier, and -1,423 (6.01%) for later years after charter 
opening. Excluding the LEP cost effects from the calculations, the net effect is statistically 
significant in the later time periods.  
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In sum, relative to the main results, districts with large charter school enrollments experience 
smaller increases in costs and greater gains in efficiency, leading to reductions in spending over 
the entire time period after charter school entry and particularly in later years. However, one 
caveat on these findings is important to mention.  The districts with the greatest charter school 
penetration include Buffalo and Rochester, which are by far the two largest districts in the 
sample and have several unique features. Thus, these districts might differ from the comparison 
group districts in ways that create bias in our difference-in-differences estimates. Since, Buffalo 
and Rochester disproportionately influences the effect estimates when the sample of treated 
districts is limited to districts with large amounts of charter school students, we might worry that 
the estimated effects for these smaller group of treated districts have larger amounts of bias than 
our primary effect estimates.   
8. Conclusions  
Our conceptual model, based on the cost function approach, suggests that charter schools 
can influence the amount of spending used to achieve student outcomes in traditional school 
districts by changing the cost and efficiency of educating students. Costs are altered if charter 
schools change the composition and number of students in traditional school districts. Efficiency 
can increase if traditional schools react to charter competition by improving services or by 
reallocating resources from less to more productive uses. Decreases in efficiency can be a result 
of unforeseen reductions in enrollment leading to underutilization of administrators and teachers 
or increased spending for new programs that do not lead to increases in students’ performance.  
The empirical analysis shows that charter schools in New York State have increased the 
cost of providing education in traditional school districts mainly by increasing the share of 
students with disabilities and receiving free lunch in district schools. Additionally, we provide 
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evidence that charter schools in New York State are associated with increased district efficiency. 
Comparing cost and efficiency impacts, cost increases are larger than efficiency gains on average 
particularly right after charter entry. In later time periods, however, both effects set each other 
off. School districts with large charter school enrollments experience smaller effects on costs and 
greater impacts on efficiency leading to spending decreases that grow over time.  
The findings have important implications for policy makers and the public finance 
literature. First, we provide additional evidence that charter schools impact enrollment and 
student composition in traditional schools. However, most districts with charter school 
enrollments have enrollments in the range where economies of scale are largely exhausted and 
the relationship between costs and enrollment is relative flat. Thus, only effects on student 
composition, and particularly in the percent free-lunch eligible and the percent disabled, 
influence the cost of providing education. In so far as studies in other states and district have also 
found that charter schools influence the share of low-income and special education students 
served by traditional public schools, these findings have more general implications. Second, our 
study establishes, theoretically and empirically, that charter schools can influence the cost and 
efficiency of providing education and that both of these factors have to be considered in 
estimating the net effect of charters on spending in traditional public schools. Our analyses 
provide a framework for assessing effects on costs and efficiency.  Third, we provide evidence 
that charter schools increase costs and the efficiency of school districts in New York, which set 
each other of on average but decrease spending in places with high charter school enrollment. 
Our findings come with two caveats, however. First, education is characterized by the 
joint production of multiple outputs, and our estimates of the effect of charter schools on district 
efficiency only control for a limited set of those outputs. Thus, the increase in efficiency we 
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estimate could reflect either the more efficient use of resources to educate students or reductions 
in spending for outcomes other than those for which we control. Second, even after controlling 
for the measures of student need that we include in our cost function, transfers to charter schools 
can leave district schools with students that have different underlying abilities to achieve 
educational objectives. We cannot determine whether the change in efficiency associated with 
charter school entry, as we measure it, is the result of improved district programming and 
operations or changes in the underlying ability of its students. 
Although there are limits to our approach of measuring charter school effects on districts 
costs and efficiency, it has the benefits of providing conceptual clarity and a framework for 
assessing the potentially countervailing effects of charter schools. Thus, we believe it would be 
useful to replicate this study for other states. More specifically, the efficiency gains presented in 
this study are likely to be associated with specific program features in New York State. 
Particularly, the application and monitoring processes New York State charter authorizers use 
has been ranked among the most comprehensive in the nation. Furthermore, almost all charter 
schools in New York State are non-profit organizations focusing on education-related missions 
and not profit maximization. These program features are likely to determine how charter schools 
influence efficiency in traditional public schools and thus our findings may only apply to states 
with similar charter policies. Application of our approach to districts in a broader set of states 
with a variety of charter school policies can help advance our understanding of charter school 
effects of traditional public school districts. 
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Table 1: Charter School Location in New York State Outside of New York City 
District 
First 
Charter 
Established 
Number of 
Charter 
Schools in 
2013/14 
Percentage of 
Charter Enrollment 
in 2013/14 
Percentage of 
Charter Students 
Outside District 
Percentage of 
Student in 
District 
Receiving Free 
Lunch in 1999 
Highest  
Percentage of 
Charter School 
Student in 
Adjacent District 
Percentage of 
Students 
Receiving Free 
Lunch in 
Adjacent District 
Albany  1999/00 11 21.71 22.15 51.48 5.41 42.67 
Buffalo  2000/01 15 20.05 4.59 66.47 24.33 62.02 
East Irondequoit1 2011/12 0 0.01 N/A 12.50 10.34 70.96 
Greece 2013/14  1 0.01 97.29 11.95 10.34 70.96 
Hempstead 2000/01 2 10.54 25.87 53.39 2.41 24.74 
Ithaca 2009/10 1 1.17 59.33 19.09 1.61 19.88 
Kenmore-Tonawanda 2001/02 1 2.53 88.72 14.89 20.05 66.47 
Lackawanna 2001/02 1 24.3 42.24 62.02 20.05 66.47 
Mohonasen2 2005/06 0 0 N/A N/A 21.71 51.48 
Mount Vernon 2011/12 1 3.1 1.25 42.45 2.03 62.12 
Newburgh 2013/14 1 0.48 8.47 43.16 0.01 4.58 
Niagara Wheatfield 2006/07 1 0.24 97.48 14.21 5.23 42.70 
Riverhead 2000/01 1 2.6 53.2 25.81 0.7 0.00 
Rochester  2001/02 9 10.34 3.49 70.96 0.45 3.04 
Roosevelt 2000/01 1 8.82 55.43 53.06 2.44 24.74 
Schenectady3 2000/01 0 1.7 N/A 49.27 0.01 7.98 
Syracuse  2000/01 2 6.05 6.36 56.20 0.01 20.78 
Troy  2001/02 2 18.68 12.91 39.39 5.4 12.45 
Utica 2013/14 1 1.76 4.47 59.57 0.19 21.13 
Yonkers  2005/06 1 2.03 3.72 62.12 3.1 42.45 
Sources: Basic Educational Data System (BEDS) and SUNY charter school institute 
1 Charter school closed in 2012/13 
2 Charter school closed in 2008/09 
3 Charter school closed in 2004/05 
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Table 2: Charter School Enrollment  
 
First Year  
 
Last Year 
District K-8 9-12 
 
K-8 9-12 
Albany  381 86 
 
1,437 863 
Buffalo  96 0 
 
4,350 3,167 
East Irondequoit1 13 0 
 
13 0 
Greece2 24 14 
 
24 14 
Hempstead 15 0 
 
759 21 
Ithaca 0 52 
 
0 61 
Kenmore-Tonawanda 29 0 
 
127 94 
Lackawanna 51 10 
 
367 245 
Mohonasen3 14 0 
 
12 0 
Mount Vernon 12 0 
 
169 83 
Newburgh2 0 54 
 
0 54 
Niagara Wheatfield 5 0 
 
10 0 
Riverhead 190 0 
 
140 0 
Rochester  301 0 
 
1,904 1,394 
Roosevelt 53 0 
 
307 0 
Schenectady4 22 0 
 
67 94 
Syracuse  349 0 
 
826 470 
Troy  21 0 
 
646 177 
Utica  43 128 
 
43 128 
Yonkers  171 0   426 88 
Notes: The table shows charter school enrollment broken down into grades  
K-8 and 9-12 for the first year a charter school was open in the district and  
the last year we observe charter school enrollment in the district.   
Sources: same as Table 1 
1 Charter school operated only one year 
2 Only one year is observed in the data 
3 Charter school operated only four years 
4 Charter school operated only five years  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Treated and Control Districts 
 
    Treated Districts    Control Districts    
      
Mean Standard  
Deviation 
  Mean Standard  
Deviation   
Mean 
Difference 
District Count   14   14    
Operating expenditures1   16,384 1,667  16,499 3,423  -114 
Performance Index1 
 
46.02 6.51  49.52 9.12  -3.5 
  
(Mean of % proficient, % earning 
diploma, and % non-dropout)          
Cost Related Variables          
  Comparable wage index2   1.02 0.12  1.00 0.13  0.02 
  Enrollment1   13,318 13,758  5,269 3,796  8,048* 
  
Percent of students with 
disabilities1   
14.37 5.12  13.75 2.78  0.62 
  Percent LEP students1   5.98 5.08  7.76 5.8  -1.78 
  Percent free lunch1   55.06 8.78  52.16 11.29  2.9 
Efficiency Variable          
  Local tax share1,3,4   0.54 0.22  0.50 0.19  0.04 
 Share of state aid 1  .05 0.1  0.05 0.1  0 
 Income per pupil1  100,197 26,151  97,647 31,937  2,549 
  Percent college graduates3,4   19.46 5.78  16.40 4.23  3.06 
  Percent youth (age 5 -17)3,4   28.22 2.19  29.08 3.85  -0.86 
Instrumental Variable          
 
Average percent of LEP students 
in the county (excluding focal 
district) 1,5  2.27 0.34  2.13 0.56  0.14 
Notes: Summary measurements are for the year 1998/99, the only year in the data set without charter schools 
for all treated districts. All monetary values are adjusted for inflation and displayed in 2014 dollars. Differences 
in means are tested using a t-test: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.    
Sources: 1 From New York State Education Department. 
                       2 From National Center for Education Statistics. 
                       3 From American Community Survey 
                       4 From U.S. Census (the annual values for inter-census years between 1999 and 2009 were   
 interpolated by using the linear growth rate between 1999 and 2009). 
                      5 From U.S. Census, Count Business Patterns 
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Table 4: Effects of Charter School Entry on Student Composition and Enrollment 
    Percentage Free Lunch Percentage LEP Percentage IEP Log Enrollment 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment                  
  Treatment   Post 2.956*  -2.821**  1.608*  -0.074***  
    (1.540)  (1.057)  (0.937)  (0.025)  
  
Treatment   Years 
1, 2, 3, and 4 Post  3.137  -2.569***  1.519  -0.062*** 
  
 
 
(2.705) 
 
(0.762) 
 
(0.930) 
 
(0.021) 
  
Treatment   Years 
5, 6, 7, and 8 Post  2.629  -2.856*  1.484  -0.089** 
  
 
 
(1.847) 
 
(1.565) 
 
(1.573) 
 
(0.035) 
          
Other  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Constant  53.071*** 53.001*** 6.433*** 6.482*** 13.891*** 13.871*** 8.6752*** 8.671*** 
    (1.05) (1.06) (0.729) (0.72) (0.701) (0.67) (0.02) (0.02) 
            
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
        Observations 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
Number of census 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.363 0.368 0.380 0.394 0.383 0.412 0.381 0.412 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
Sources: All sources are the same as in Table 3.   
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Table 5: Estimates of Cost Functions 
Log of per pupil operating expenditure excl. charter tuition 
  
Performance Index 0.52143 
  (0.54087) 
Comparable wage index 0.96769*** 
  (0.10085) 
Enrollmenta -0.12568 
  (0.23242) 
Enrollment squareda 0.00507 
  (0.01331) 
Percent of students with disabilities 0.00473* 
  (0.00270) 
Percent LEP students 0.00004 
  (0.00470) 
Percent free lunch 0.00436*** 
  (0.00101) 
Local tax sharea -0.10613* 
  (0.05519) 
State aid terma 0.03337 
 (0.03296) 
Income per pupila 0.19091*** 
  (0.06967) 
Percent college graduates 0.07331** 
  (0.03482) 
Percent youth (age 5 - 17) -0.01382 
  
(0.09534) 
 
Observations 287 
R-squared 0.6759 
Notes:  Regression is estimated instrumenting for performance. Coefficients have  
four digits behind the decimal point. Robust standard errors are clustered at the  
district level: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
a Variable is log transformed 
Sources: All variables measured in school year 1998/99, the only year in the data  
set without charter schools for all treated districts. All sources are the same as in  
Table 3.   
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Table 6: Effects on Cost and Efficiency in Dollar Values 
One post period 
(1) 
1 to 4 years 
(2) 
5 to 8 years 
(3) 
Cost Effects 
 Free Lunch $526** $558* $468 
(221) (308) (243) 
 LEP -$42 -$39 -$43 
(4,983) (4,539) (243) 
 IEP $1,189 $1,123 $1,098 
(877) (823) (901) 
 Enrollment (avg.) $52 $43 $62 
(41) (35) (50) 
 Sum $1,724 $1,686 $1,584 
(4,871) (4,457) (4,946) 
 Sum (excl. IEP) $1,767** 1,725** 1,627** 
(885) (836) (918) 
Efficiency $741** $809*** $1,528*** 
(337) (247) (337) 
Net $983 $877 $56 
(4,898) (4,471) (4,947) 
 Net (excl. IEP) $1,026 $916 $99 
(948) (893) (998) 
Notes: Cost effects are calculated using Equations 3 and 4. Average enrollment is 13,318  
students. Efficiency effects are taken from Table 6. The financial numbers for Models 1 to 3 
are calculated using the average per pupil operating expenditure for treaded districts in 2014 
($22,469). The delta method is used to calculate standard errors, which are stated in  
parentheses. Standard errors are: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Efficiency Estimates 
Log of per pupil operating expenditure excl. charter tuition 
(1) (2) 
Treatment X Post -0.033**
(0.015)
Treatment X Years 1, 2, 3, and 4 
Post -0.036***
(0.011)
Treatment X Years 5, 6, 7, and 8 
Post -0.068***
(0.015)
Controls Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 448 448 
R-squared 0.871 0.912 
# Districts 28 28 
Notes: Models include the same variables as in Table 5. Variables are measured from 
1998/99 to 2013/14. Regression is estimated instrumenting for performance. Robust  
standard errors are clustered at the district level: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0. 
Sources: All sources are the same as in Table 3.  
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Table 8: Effects on Student Composition and Enrollment Extended Analysis  
  
Share Free Lunch Share LEP Share IEP Log Enrollment 
Large Share Charter Enrollment 
Treatment         
 
Treatment X Post 2.363  -1.801  0.513  -0.122***  
 
 (1.495)  (1.433)  (1.061)  (0.0322)  
 
Treatment X Years  2.863  -1.879**  0.086  -0.068*** 
 
 1, 2, 3, and 4 Post  (3.413)  (0.746)  (0.571)  (0.021) 
 
Treatment X Years   5.637***  -1.889  0.253  -0.135*** 
 
5, 6, 7, and 8 Post  (1.358)  (1.993)  (1.424)  (0.032) 
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
R2   0.538 0.556 0.447 0.456 0.23 0.267 0.388 0.475 
Notes: Regressions include year and districts fixed effects. Constants are not displayed. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
Sources: All sources are the same as in Table 3.     
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Table 9: Effects on Cost and Efficiency in Dollar Values for Extended 
Analysis  
Large Share Charter Enrollment 
One post 
period 
(1) 
1 to 4 years 
(2) 
5 to 8 years 
(3) 
Cost Effects 
 Free Lunch $443 $536 $1,057*** 
(318) (492) (381) 
 LEP -$29 -$30 -$30 
(3,353) (3,499) (3,499) 
 IEP $400 $67 $197 
(547) (495) (517) 
 Enrollment (avg.) $90 $50 $99 
(71) (41) (79) 
 Sum $904 $624 $1,323 
(3,389) (3,592) (3,708) 
 Sum (excl. IEP) 932 $654 $1,353** 
(595) (640) (636) 
Efficiency -$1,089** -$1,089*** -$2,746*** 
(427) (359) (382) 
Net -$185 -$465 -$1,423 
(3,423) (3,614) (3,734) 
 Net (excl. IEP) -$156 -$435 -$1,393*** 
(725) (747) (750) 
Notes: Cost effects are calculated using Equations 3 and 4. Average  
enrollment is 17,674 for districts with large charter school enrollments 
and 13,318 for all treated districts. Efficiency effects are taken from  
Table 9. The financial numbers for Models 1 to 3 are calculated using  
the average per pupil operating expenditure for treaded districts with  
large charter school enrollments in 2014 ($23,674). For Models 4 to 6, 
we use average per pupil expenditure for all treated districts in 2014  
($22,469). The delta method is used to calculate standard errors,  
which are stated in parentheses. Robust standard errors are:  
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Efficiency Estimates for Extended Analysis 
Log of per pupil operating expenditure excl. charter tuition 
Large Share Charter Enrollment 
(1) (2) 
Treatment X Post -0.046**
(0.019)
Treatment X Years 1, 2, 3, and 4 Post -0.046***
(0.016)
Treatment X Years 5, 6, 7, and 8 Post -0.116***
(0.017)
Observations 320 320 
R-squared 0.921 0.931 
# Districts 20 20 
Notes: Models include the same variables as in Table 5. Variables are measured 
from 1998/99 to 2013/14. Regression is estimated instrumenting for  
performance. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level:  
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 a Variable is log transformed. 
Sources: All sources are the same as in Table 3.   
